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I. Introduction 
Insider trading has long been debated in law and economics literature.1  The 
central question is whether insider trading is efficiency-improving or efficiency-reducing 
for firms and the stock market as a whole.  At the market level, the debate concerns the 
effect of insider trading on characteristics of the stock market, such as stock market 
liquidity and volatility and stock price efficiency or accuracy.  The relevant question here 
is whether insider trading enhances or reduces stock market efficiency.  At the firm level, 
the debate focuses on the impact of insider trading on the intra-firm agency conflict, the 
classic conflict of interest between managers or controlling shareholders (the agents) and 
non-controlling shareholders (the principals).2  The salient question at the firm level is 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Research Fellow, William 
Davidson Institute, Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan.  I am very grateful to 
Andrei Shleifer and Raphael La Porta for their advice and for sharing their data with me.  I also thank Anita 
Anand,  Utpal Bhattacharya,  Samuel Buell, Robert Daines, John DiNardo, Merritt Fox, Joshua Gessler, 
Sam Gross, Jim Hines, Howell Jackson, Bruce Johnsen, Myra Kim, Richard Lempert, Paul Mahoney, Peter 
Marbach, Ernst Maug, Barak Orbach, JJ Prescott, Adam Pritchard, Mark Roe, Daria Roithmayr, Darren 
Roulstone, Najat Seyhun, Robert Trezevant, Brady West, Lingling Zhang, and participants at the 2004 John 
M. Olin Conference on Empirical Research in Corporate, Bankruptcy and Securities Law at the University 
of Virginia School of Law, the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, 
Northwestern University, the Journal of Law, Economics & Policy’s Symposium on Insider Trading, 
George Mason University, January 28, 2007, and the Enforcement of Corporate Governance Rules 
Conference, Harvard Law School, March 2007 for helpful discussions and suggestions on various drafts.  
In addition, I thank Ron Alquist and Jonathan Ho for excellent research assistance and Al LaGrone for 
editorial help.  Finally, I am grateful to the Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business at Harvard Law 
School, the Cook Fund, and the Center for Law and Economics at the University of Michigan, and the 
Hoover Institution, Stanford University for providing generous financial support. 
1  For a summary of the debate, see Beny (2007a); Bainbridge (1999). 
2  See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for description of the agency conflict and agency costs. 
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whether insider trading ameliorates or worsens this conflict.  This article focuses on the 
impact of insider trading on the agency conflict within the firm.3   
The impact of insider trading on the intra-firm agency conflict is an important 
issue because it raises the weighty corollary question of who ought to monitor and 
regulate insider trading:  the government, via a blanket prohibition of insider trading, 
versus firms and shareholders, via private contracting.  There are three major views on 
the impact of insider trading on the agency conflict.  The first position is that insider 
trading mitigates this conflict and therefore insider trading regulation reduces intra-firm 
efficiency.  (Carlton and Fischel 1983).  In contrast, the second position holds that insider 
trading exacerbates the agency conflict and consequently insider trading regulation 
promotes intra-firm efficiency.  (e.g., Cox 1986; Manove 1989; Kraakman 1991; Klock 
1994; Maug 2002). 
The third position straddles the fence, maintaining that the effect of insider 
trading on the agency conflict is indeterminate and varies across firms.  Nevertheless, 
according to proponents of the third view, private contracting is superior to insider 
trading regulation because private parties are more capable than the government of 
assessing the effect of insider trading on the corporation.  (see, e.g., Haddock and Macey 
1987; Epstein 2004).4  Private contracting will promote varied and efficient responses to 
insider trading across firms.  According to those who espouse the third view, firms in 
                                                 
3  See, e.g., Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) for evidence of the effects of insider trading and/or 
insider trading regulation on stock markets as a whole. 
4  Carlton and Fischel (1983) may also be categorized under the third view because they consider the 
possibility that insider trading harms the firm by reducing liquidity of the firm’s shares.  But they 
ultimately dismiss this possibility by arguing that if it were true, we would have observed firms voluntarily 
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which insider trading exacerbates the agency conflict will prohibit insider trading, while 
firms in which insider trading mitigates the agency conflict will permit insider trading. 
Although law and economics scholars have long stressed the need for empirical 
evidence on the impact of insider trading on the intra-firm agency conflict (see, e.g., 
Carlton and Fischel 1983 and Easterbrook 1985), there were few empirical studies on this 
topic until recently.5  Because insider trading is illegal in virtually every country with a 
public stock market (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002), it is impossible to conduct a direct 
empirical test of whether insider trading exacerbates the agency conflict and whether 
private contracting is superior to a mandatory ban.6  However, we can assess these issues 
indirectly by exploiting cross-country variation in the strength of insider trading laws and 
enforcement.7  If insider trading exacerbates the agency conflict, we would expect insider 
trading regulation (assuming it is effective) to be associated with higher corporate value 
because corporate value is a proxy for agency costs.  (Morck, et. al. 1988).8  This article 
investigates the latter proposition by examining the relationship between the strength of a 
country’s insider trading laws and corporate value.   
                                                 
5 The main evidence adduced by opponents of insider trading regulation in support of their 
deregulatory position is the historical survival of insider trading in the United States prior to the enactment 
of insider trading rules, without any apparent attempt by private parties to prohibit insider trading.  (Carlton 
and Fischel 1983).  According to Carlton and Fischel (1983), this evidence suggests that shareholders did 
not perceive insider trading to exacerbate the agency conflict because, if they had, they would have 
prohibited insiders from trading long before the legislature and the courts preempted the issue.  In response, 
Judge Easterbrook (1985) argues that the historical survival of insider trading in the United States may 
have meant merely that the cost of such contracting was too high, not that shareholders had no desire to 
prohibit insider trading.  (Easterbrook 1985; see also Cox 1986).  Recent empirical studies on insider 
trading laws and enforcement include Ackerman and Maug (2006); Beny (2005, 2007a); Bhattacharya and 
Daouk (2002, 2005); Bris (2005); and Durnev and Nain (2005).  All of these recent studies provide 
evidence on the cross-country implications of insider trading laws and enforcement. 
6  Also, the near-universal illegality of insider trading arguably places the burden on opponents of 
insider trading regulation to show that such regulation is more costly than beneficial, since they seek to 
change the current status quo. 
7 This is not possible at the domestic level unless, like Canada, a country exhibits state/provincial 
variation in its insider trading laws and enforcement, or unless one uses time series data for a single country 
that span periods before and after the enactment of insider trading legislation.  
8  See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for the original formulation of agency costs. 
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Based on a simple agency model of corporate value diversion through insider 
trading by a controlling shareholder, I derive two empirically testable hypotheses about 
the relationship between corporate value and insider trading laws: (1) more stringent 
insider trading laws increase firm value by reducing the controlling shareholder’s 
incentive to divert corporate value through insider trading and (2) more stringent insider 
trading laws and an increase in the controlling shareholder’s financial stake in the firm 
are substitute means to mitigate the agency conflict.  I test these hypotheses using firm-
level data from a cross-section of large firms from twenty-seven developed countries.  
This article’s central finding is that stronger insider trading laws and enforcement are 
associated with higher corporate valuation for the firms in common law countries, but not 
for the firms in civil law countries.9   
Part II of this article provides an overview of existing law, economics, and 
finance literature that characterizes insider trading as an agency issue and presents the 
two hypotheses.  Part III describes the data and presents descriptive statistics.  Part IV 
outlines the empirical methodology and presents the regression results.  Part V addresses 
the robustness of the results.  Finally, Part VI concludes. 
II. Prior Literature and Hypotheses 
 This Part summarizes prior literature characterizing insider trading as an agency 
issue and presents two empirically testable hypotheses. 
A. Insider Trading Ameliorates the Agency Conflict between Managers 
 and Shareholders 
 
                                                 
9 I do not find that cash flow ownership and insider trading laws are substitute means to control 
agency costs within the firm.  If anything, my evidence suggests that insider trading laws and ownership are 
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 Manne (1966) was the first legal scholar to point out the potential beneficial role 
of insider trading as a form of compensation.  In Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 
he argues that insider trading is valuable to firms because it motivates insiders to be more 
entrepreneurial.  According to Manne (1966), “entrepreneurs” within the firm, and their 
productive output, are difficult to identify ex ante.  Thus, if corporate insiders’ 
compensation is set in advance, it will be inefficient because it will not be calibrated to 
their ex post entrepreneurial activity.  In contrast, when corporate insiders are allowed to 
engage in insider trading, they will be rewarded (via insider trading profits) in direct 
proportion to and contemporaneously with their innovations.  In this manner, insider 
trading can maximize insiders’ incentives to innovate and thereby improve corporate 
performance. 
 Carlton and Fischel (1983) recast Manne’s (1966) efficient compensation thesis 
within the modern framework of agency and contract theory.  In their view, capital and 
product markets do not adequately discipline or incentivize managers because these 
markets work imperfectly.  Ex ante compensation contracts are also deficient because 
they often require costly “periodic renegotiations ex post based on (imperfectly) observed 
effort and output.”  (Carlton and Fischel 1983, 869).   
 In contrast, insider trading enables managers to continually update their 
compensation in light of new information without incurring renegotiation costs.  Insider 
trading increases managers’ incentives by linking their “fortunes more closely to those of 
the firm.”  (Carlton and Fischel 1983, 877).  More specifically, insider trading aligns 
managers’ and shareholders’ interests by allowing managers to profit from the increase in 
 4
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firm value caused by their efforts.10  Carlton and Fischel (1983) also argue that insider 
trading improves the managerial labor market by reducing firms’ screening and 
monitoring costs,11 because the most capable and least risk averse managers will self-
select into the firms that permit insider trading.     
 The theoretical economics and finance literature also contains several accounts of 
insider trading as a mechanism to reduce the agency conflict within the firm.  Dye (1984) 
uses a mathematical model to prove Carlton and Fischel’s (1983) claim that insider 
trading may increase shareholder wealth by better aligning manager and shareholder 
interests than standard earnings-contingent contracts.  Bebchuk and Fershtman show that 
insider trading may enhance corporate value by increasing managers’ effort levels 
(Bebchuk and Fershtman 1993) or by causing them to select risky but profitable 
investment projects that otherwise would be rejected if they were not allowed to trade on 
inside information.  (Bebchuk and Fershtman, 1994).  The mathematical proofs of these 
propositions formalize Carlton and Fischel’s (1983) non-technical arguments.  Finally, 
Noe (1997) demonstrates with a formal model that, even if insider trading does not 
increase insiders’ effort levels, it may cost firms less (i.e., involve lower managerial 
rents) than standard compensation contracts because of a “substitution effect between 
explicit managerial compensation and insider trading” profits.  (Noe 1997, 311).  That is, 
when managers engage in insider trading, firms pay them lower salaries.12
                                                 
10  In response, opponents of insider trading argue that managers can also profit from corporate 
failures that they have caused by taking short positions in their firms’ stocks.  See Part II.B below. 
11  Lower screening and monitoring costs imply lower agency costs. 
12  Roulstone confirms the existence of a substitution effect between insider trading and total 
compensation:  “firms that restrict when insiders can trade pay a 4% to 13% premium in total compensation 
relatives to firms that do not restrict insider trading, after controlling for economic determinants of 
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B. Insider Trading Exacerbates the Agency Conflict between Managers 
 and Shareholders 
 
 Some law and economics scholars argue that, rather than aligning shareholder and 
manager interests, insider trading may exacerbate the agency conflict.  Kraakman (1991) 
argues that, through insider trading, managers may be able, ex post, to sabotage an 
efficient ex ante compensation contract and thereby counteract performance-based 
compensation schemes intended to calibrate pay to productivity.  (Kraakman 1991).   
 Cox (1986) argues that it is very difficult in practice to ensure that those who 
create valuable information (i.e., entrepreneurial innovations) are the only ones within the 
firm who are able to profit from it.  To the extent that the firm’s “true” entrepreneurs 
cannot exclude other insiders from profiting on the positive information, their incentives 
to innovate will be reduced rather than increased.  Furthermore, the non-excludability of 
insider trading profits may cause the firm’s “true” entrepreneurs to conceal their 
information to monopolize insider trading profits, and thus reduce the flow of 
information and productive efficiency within the firm.  (Haft 1982). 
 Some legal scholars also argue that allowing managers to trade on inside 
information may give them incentives to take on too much risk or to undertake projects 
that reduce corporate value.  Because insider trading is more profitable when stock prices 
are more volatile, insider trading may encourage managers to undertake excessively risky 
projects (to increase volatility) that would create private opportunities for profitable 
insider trading but that would reduce corporate value.  (Kraakman 1991).  In addition, 
because managers can profit from insider trading regardless of corporate performance, 
insider trading may increase managers’ incentive to under-perform by making them 
indifferent between good and bad corporate performance.  (Anabtawi 1989; Kraakman 
 6
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1991; Klock 1994).  If corporate insiders are permitted to sell the firm’s shares short, the 
potential problems of excessive risk-taking13 and compensation unbundling induced by 
insider trading may be worsened.  (Klock 1994).  
 Several theoretical economics and finance articles also demonstrate that insider 
trading may worsen the agency conflict between managers and shareholders.  Manove 
formally demonstrates how insider trading can reduce corporate value by discouraging 
investment because corporate insiders “with private information are able to appropriate 
some part of the returns to corporate investments…at the expense of other shareholders.”  
(Manove 1989, 823).14  If shareholders suspect such appropriation, they will favor a 
reduction in corporate investment.  Bebchuk and Fershtman (1990) show that insider 
trading may increase managers’ incentive to “waste” corporate value by encouraging 
them to make decisions that maximize their potential trading profits rather than corporate 
value.  
C. Insider Trading has an Indeterminate Impact on the Agency Conflict 
 between Managers and Shareholders 
 
 As noted above, some scholars are agnostic about whether insider trading is 
harmful to the firm and suggest that the effect of insider trading probably varies across 
firms.  (Haddock and Macey 1987; Epstein 2004).   
D.  Dominant Shareholders: Insider Trading and Monitoring 
 Another strand of insider trading literature addresses the impact of insider trading 
in the context where there is a dominant (controlling) shareholder in the firm.  By virtue 
of their controlling position, large shareholders have greater access to corporate 
                                                 
13  In response, some legal scholars argue that insider trading mitigates managers’ excessive risk 
aversion.  Cartlon and Fischel (1983).   
14  Douglas (1989) also shows that the information asymmetry due to insider trading transfers wealth 
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management and, as a result, to material, non-public information.  Thus, like managers, 
they can earn greater profits from trading than small shareholders.  There are two 
conflicting views about the impact of insider trading on controlling shareholders’ 
incentives to monitor managers.15     
 Demsetz and Bhide argue that insider trading increases controlling shareholders’ 
incentives to monitor managers.  Controlling shareholders are beneficial to firms, they 
argue, because these shareholders have greater incentives to monitor managers (and thus 
to mitigate the manager-shareholder agency conflict) than small, dispersed shareholders 
who face collective action problems.  However, holding a concentrated ownership 
position imposes risks on the dominant shareholder, in particular the risks of holding an 
undiversified portfolio.  (Demsetz 1986; Bhide 1993).  Thus, controlling shareholders 
must be compensated both for assuming the risks of concentrated ownership and for 
monitoring managers.  (Demsetz 1986; Bhide 1993).  Demsetz and Bhide argue that 
insider trading profits are a convenient way to compensate controlling shareholders for 
these activities.  (Demsetz 1986; Bhide 1993).  Restricting insider trading may therefore 
have a negative impact on corporate value by reducing controlling shareholders’ 
incentives to monitor by raising the costs and liabilities of active shareholding.  (Demsetz 
1986; Bhide 1993). 
 In contrast, Maug (2002) suggests that insider trading may adversely affect 
controlling shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers.  In Maug’s view, large 
shareholders may use their dominance in the service of their own (and managers’) 
interests at the expense of small shareholders if they are permitted to engage in insider 
                                                 
15 See Jensen and Meckling (1976); Demsetz (1986); Shleifer and Vishny (1986); Bhide (1993). 
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trading.16  Using a mathematical model, Maug shows how insider trading can induce 
large shareholders to expropriate corporate value from small investors rather than 
monitor managers.  In the model, managers may bribe dominant shareholders not to 
discipline them when they are performing poorly by sharing private information with 
those shareholders.  If the firm’s stock is sufficiently liquid, trading on such information 
is profitable, and large shareholders may prefer to trade on this information instead of 
monitoring managers (i.e., foregone trading profits represent the opportunity cost of 
monitoring).  In summary, Maug’s model suggests that banning insider trading may align 
the interests of controlling and small shareholders, while permitting insider trading may 
increase the likelihood that dominant shareholders will collude with shirking managers, 
in exchange for trading profits at the expense of minority shareholders and corporate 
performance. 
 The impact of insider trading on managers’ and controlling shareholders’ 
incentives and thus on the agency conflict is ultimately an empirical question, which has  
yet to be satisfactorily answered.  (Easterbrook 1985).  This article attempts to answer 
this question by investigating the relationship between corporate valuation and insider 
trading laws across countries.17  It builds upon La Porta et al.’s (2002) empirical study of 
the relationship between investor protection and corporate valuation. 
                                                 
16 Along similar lines, La Porta et al. (1999) suggests that the primary agency problem in firms with 
controlling shareholders “is not the failure of the Berle and Means (1932) professional managers to serve 
minority shareholders, but rather the...expropriation of such minorities…by controlling shareholders.”  (La 
Porta et al. (1999), pp. 3-4).  The implication is that the law ought to be concerned not only with preventing 
managerial value diversion but also with containing expropriation by large shareholders.  (see, e.g., La 
Porta et al. 1998; La Porta, et al. 1999; and Bukart and Panunzi 2006).  
17 The article by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) is distinguishable in that they investigate the 
relationship between the enactment and enforcement of insider trading laws and the aggregate cost of 
capital across countries.  Moreover, while Masson and Madhavan (1991) examine the relationship between 
executives’ insider trading and the marginal value of the firm, their study differs from the present study in 
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E. Hypotheses 
 
 This article tests two hypotheses regarding the effect of insider trading regulation 
on the agency conflict in firms that have a controlling shareholder.18
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1).  More stringent insider trading laws increase firm value by reducing 
the controlling shareholder’s incentive to divert corporate value through insider 
trading.19
 
 The first hypothesis (H1) addresses the first order effect of insider trading laws on 
corporate value.  As noted above, the literature contains conflicting accounts of the effect 
of insider trading on the agency conflict (and hence corporate value).  Bhide (1993) and 
Demsetz (1986) argue that insider trading is beneficial because it compensates 
controlling shareholders for the valuable monitoring role that they play.  The implication 
is that prohibiting insider trading will reduce controlling shareholders’ incentives to 
monitor managers, to the detriment of corporate value.  (Bhide 1993).  Maug (2002) 
counters with the claim that prohibiting insider trading will increase controlling 
                                                                                                                                                 
trading, and it does not address the role of insider trading law/enforcement as a potential constraint upon 
executives’ incentives to trade.   
18  I focus on firms with a controlling shareholder for two reasons.  First, while a substantial part of 
the prior literature focuses on the conflict between managers and shareholders, the conflict between 
managers and controlling shareholders on the one hand and minority shareholders on the other hand is 
probably the more salient conflict outside of the United States.  (La Porta et al. 2002).  Since I test the 
hypotheses on international data, this consideration motivates my focus on firms with a controlling 
shareholder.  Second, testing the implications of insider trading laws in firms with dispersed share 
ownership would require data on executive compensation, since insider trading profits may substitute for 
other forms of compensation and insider trading may thus have a non-discernable impact on corporate 
value (assuming there are no incentive effects).  (Roulstone 2003; Noe 1997).  Yet, these data are not 
readily available for foreign corporations.  In contrast, data on the existence of controlling shareholders and 
their ownership and control stakes are available.  Controlling shareholders are subject directly or indirectly 
to the insider trading prohibition in all of the countries in my sample.  
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shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers instead of colluding with them at the 
expense of minority shareholders.  Under Maug’s (2002) account, insider trading laws 
force controlling shareholders to internalize the costs that insider trading imposes upon 
minority shareholders, while reducing their benefits from insider trading.  H1, which 
adopts Maug’s (2002) view as the null hypothesis, puts these competing claims to the 
empirical test. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2).  Insider trading laws and the controlling shareholder’s financial 
stake in the firm are substitute means to mitigate the agency conflict.  Therefore, the 
more restrictive the insider trading prohibition, the lower the marginal increase in 
corporate value from an increase in the controlling shareholder’s financial stake in the 
firm.20
 The second hypothesis (H2) predicts a substitution effect between the insider 
trading prohibition and the controlling shareholder’s financial stake in the firm.21  For the 
reasons explained above, the insider trading prohibition may mitigate the conflict of 
interest between controlling and minority shareholders.  The financial stake of the 
controlling shareholder may also mitigate this conflict. 22  Assuming that insider trading 
is costly to the firm, the controlling shareholder will bear a greater share of this cost as 
                                                 
20  The alternative hypothesis is that insider trading laws and the controlling shareholder’s financial 
stake are complementary ways to mitigate the agency conflict. 
21  This prediction is analogous to the hypothesized substitution effect between executive 
compensation and managers’ profits from insider trading.  (Carlton and Fischel 1983).  See Easterbrook 
(1985) on the potential substitutability between insider trading laws and other mechanisms to mitigate the 
agency conflict between managers and shareholders.  See also Bukart and Panunzi (2006), who discuss 
substitution between investor protection laws and alternative agency cost control devices. 
22  This is the established insight that greater cash flow ownership by corporate insiders (managers, 
large shareholders, etc.) lowers their incentives to divert corporate wealth from outside investors.  For 
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her financial stake in the firm increases.  Thus, her incentive to trade will fall as her 
ownership stake in the firm increases if insider trading is detrimental to the firm.   
 Assuming insider trading is detrimental, the substitution hypothesis (H2) predicts 
that, as the controlling shareholder’s financial stake increases, the marginal valuation 
effect of an increase in the stringency of the insider trading prohibition will fall.  
(Equivalently, as the insider trading prohibition becomes more stringent, the marginal 
valuation effect of an increase in the controlling shareholder’s financial stake will fall.)   
 Table 1 summarizes the article’s empirically testable hypotheses. 
III. Data and Summary Statistics 
 In this Part, I describe the data and present summary statistics. 
The Data 
 La Porta and his co-authors shared their firm-level data with me.  They assembled 
valuation and ownership information for the twenty largest firms (based on market 
capitalization) in twenty-seven developed countries (based on 1993 per capita income).  
La Porta et al. (2002) focuses on large firms because it is more difficult to detect the 
beneficial impact of investor protection laws on corporate value for large firms.23  Their 
sample excludes firms that are foreign-affiliates as well as banks and other financial 
institutions.  Most of the data are for 1995 and 1996, but a few data points come from 
1997 and two observations are from before 1995.  (La Porta et al. 2002).   
Like La Porta et al. (2002), I consider only firms that have an identifiable 
controlling shareholder.  I focus on this type of firm because controlling shareholders 
                                                 
23 As La Porta et al. (2002) point out, large firms may have several alternative means to constrain 
expropriation of minority investors, “including public scrutiny, reputation-building, foreign shareholdings, 
or listings on international exchanges.”  (La Porta et al. 2002, p. 16).   Consequently, the benefits of legal 
constraints ought to be harder to detect in large firms. 
 12
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have superior access to inside information relative to small shareholders and therefore 
have a greater opportunity to engage in insider trading by colluding with managers at the 
expense of small shareholders.  At the same time, controlling shareholders are better able 
to monitor managers in the interest of small shareholders and presumably will do so if 
they are adequately compensated.  These competing tendencies highlight the struggle 
between the net effect of insider trading on controlling shareholders’ incentive to monitor 
managers and expropriate value from minority shareholders.  (compare Bhide (1993) and 
Demsetz (1986) with Maug (2002)).  I adopt La Porta et al.’s (2002) definition of control 
where a shareholder is deemed to have control over the firm if the shareholder owns ten 
percent or more of the firm’s voting shares.   
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is “Tobin’s Q,” a measure of corporate 
valuation and proxy for agency costs commonly used in corporate finance literature.  
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement cost of its 
assets.24  A larger Tobin’s Q suggests that the market values the firm more highly than 
firms with a lower Tobin’s Q.  Higher Tobin’s Q may result from the market’s optimism 
about the firm’s future growth prospects because of good management, lower agency 
costs, favorable market conditions, or a high level of goodwill.  I use La Porta et al.’s 
(2002) measure of Tobin’s Q, which they define as “the book value of assets minus the 
book value of equity minus deferred taxes plus the market value of common stock” (i.e., 
the market value of assets) divided “by the book value of assets.”  (La Porta et al. 2002, 
                                                 
24 Tobin’s Q is not a perfect measure of firm valuation, since the numerator partly reflects the market 
value of intangible assets, but the denominator does not include the firm’s investments in intangible assets.  
See Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) for a more thorough discussion of the pros and cons of Tobin’s Q 
relative to alternative valuation measures.  Nevertheless, it is one of the most commonly used measures of 
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p. 1156).  Controlling for other factors that may affect corporate valuation, if insider 
trading laws mitigate the agency conflict and thereby reduce agency costs, firms in 
countries with more stringent insider trading laws ought to have higher Tobin’s Qs. 
Independent Variables  
Both countries’ insider trading laws and controlling shareholders’ financial stakes 
in firms may influence these shareholders’ choice between monitoring and colluding with 
managers.  Thus, I include measures of these characteristics as independent variables in 
the regressions presented in Part IV.  
Hypothesis 1 (H1) predicts that firms in countries with more stringent insider 
trading laws have higher market valuations because such laws reduce controlling 
shareholders’ incentive to divert corporate value through insider trading.  As a measure of 
the stringency of insider trading laws, I use Beny’s (2005) insider trading law index 
(ITL).  ITL is an index of five substantive elements of each country’s insider trading law: 
(1) whether the law prohibits insiders from tipping outsiders; (2) whether the law 
prohibits trading by tippees25; (3) whether the law provides a private right of action to 
investors who traded opposite the insider(s) who traded in violation of the country’s 
insider trading law; (4) whether the potential damages are a multiple of the insider’s 
trading profits; and (5) whether violation of the law is a criminal offense.26  Each element 
is assigned the value of zero or one, and the total ITL index is the sum of the individual 
elements.  Thus, ITL equals five in countries with the most prohibitive insider trading 
laws (e.g., the United States), and ITL equals zero in countries with the least prohibitive 
                                                 
25 Tippees are outsiders who receive material non-public information from corporate insiders who 
are prohibited from trading on the basis of such information themselves. 
26 In Beny (2007a) I explain in more detail the rationale for including each element of the law in the 
insider trading law index. 
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insider trading laws (e.g., Mexico and Norway).27  The insider trading laws of all the 
countries in the sample prohibit insider trading by controlling shareholders, either directly 
or indirectly.  Thus, at least in theory, controlling shareholders who engage in illegal 
insider trading in these countries are subject to the sanctions coded in the Beny (2005) 
index.   
The insider trading laws on the books are one matter.  Whether they are enforced 
and to what degree is another matter altogether because the laws’ deterrent effect is a 
function of the probability that they will be enforced.  (see, e.g., Zimring and Hawkins, 
1973).  Unfortunately, reliable international data on the frequency and degree of insider 
trading enforcement is not available.  Thus, for the time being, I must rely on a fairly 
rudimentary enforcement measure.  That measure is a dummy variable that is equal to 
one if a country’s insider trading law was enforced at least once prior to 1994, and zero 
otherwise.28   I call this measure Enforced and I include it as an independent variable in 
the regressions.  I also include the interaction between (i.e., the product of) ITL and 
Enforced in the regressions.   
The underlying data from which I construct the variable Enforced are from 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), who report the year in which over one hundred countries 
enforced their insider trading laws for the first time.  This measure of enforcement is 
admittedly problematic.  That a country has enforced the law at least once by 1994 does 
not provide much insight on the frequency and degree of enforcement.  Nevertheless, it 
                                                 
27 All of the countries in the sample had insider trading laws on the books as of 1994.  In fact, most 
stock markets have insider trading laws, but the rate and timing of enforcement varies considerably across 
markets.  See Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) and Beny (2007b). 
28  I choose 1994 as the cut-off date because the dependent variables come from around the period 
1995-1996 and because the insider trading law indices are based on the sample countries’ insider trading 
rules as they existed around the same period.  Both the content and the enforcement of these laws may have 
changed in many of these countries since 1994.  See Herrington (2004) for more recent measures of insider 
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may be a proxy (even if a noisy one) for active enforcement based on the logic that 
having been enforced once, a law is more likely to be enforced again.  It may also 
distinguish sham regimes from non-sham or partially-sham regimes.  H1 predicts that the 
regression coefficients on both Enforced and the product of ITL and Enforced will be 
positive. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) predicts a substitution effect between the insider trading 
prohibition and the controlling shareholder’s financial stake in the firm.  That is, H2 
predicts that as the controlling shareholder’s financial stake increases, the marginal 
positive effect (on corporate value) of an increase in the stringency of the insider trading 
prohibition will fall.  As a measure of the controlling shareholder’s financial stake, I use 
La Porta et al.’s (2002) measure of the proportion of the firm’s cash flow rights directly 
and indirectly owned by the controlling shareholder.  I control for this measure directly in 
the regressions because, as noted above, when the controlling shareholder has a greater 
financial stake in the firm, she will bear a greater proportion of any losses caused by the 
agency conflict that may be exacerbated by insider trading.  In addition, to test H2, I 
include the interaction between (i.e., the product of) the insider trading law index, ITL, 
and the controlling shareholder’s financial stake as a separate independent variable in the 
regressions.  H2 predicts that the regression coefficient on this interaction term will be 
negative. 
Control Variables 
I include several additional control variables in the regressions below.  Prior 
research shows that corporate valuation is positively related to the firm’s investment 
opportunities.  Following La Porta et al. (2002), I use sales growth as a proxy for the 
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firm’s investment opportunities.  La Porta et al. define sales growth as the average annual 
rate of growth of the firm’s sales for the previous three-year period (or fewer years, if 
three years’ of sales data are unavailable). 
Prior research also demonstrates that common law legal origin is positively 
related to the level of investor protection in a country and to the country’s degree of 
financial development and corporate valuation.  (see, e.g., La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 
2002).29  Conversely, civil law legal origin is negatively related to investor protection, 
financial development, and corporate valuation.  (Id.).  Therefore, I include a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm’s country is a common law country and zero if the 
firm’s country is a civil law country.  I also control for industry because corporate 
valuation is likely to vary systematically by industry, as discussed below.   
The data are described in Table 2. 
 Summary Statistics 
Table 3 presents the mean and median values of several key variables for the full 
sample and for each individual country in the sample.  I divide the sample into two 
regimes: Low ITL and High ITL.  The cutoff between High ITL and Low ITL is the 
median value of the interaction term, ITL*Enforced, which equals two.  I classify 
countries with a value of ITL*Enforced that is greater than the median of two as High 
ITL regimes, while I classify those with a value of ITL*Enforced that is less than or equal 
to the median of two as Low ITL regimes.  Consistent with H1, the High ITL countries 
have higher mean and median values of Tobin’s Q than the Low ITL countries,  The t-test 
statistic reveals that the difference in mean Tobin’s Q between the High ITL and the Low 
                                                 
29  Roe (2006) argues, however, that politics explains different levels of financial development across 
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ITL countries is statistically significant at the 1% level.  However, the difference in 
median Tobin’s Q between the High ITL and the Low ITL countries is not statistically 
significant.   
Consistent with H2, Table 3 also shows that the controlling shareholder tends to 
own a larger fraction of the firm’s cash flows in the Low ITL countries than in the High 
ITL countries..  The differences in both mean and median cash flow ownership between 
the two regimes are statistically significant at the 1% level.  Finally, mean and median 
sales growth are higher in the High ITL countries than in the Low ITL countries, and the 
difference is statistically significant at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively.  This 
suggests that the firms in the High ITL countries tend to have greater investment 
opportunities than the firms in the Low ITL countries.   
 Table 4 presents the means by legal origin.  The common law countries in the 
sample have a greater average value of ITL than the civil law countries in the sample.  
This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Nearly half of the common law 
countries have enforced their insider trading laws at least once.  In comparison, only 25% 
of the civil law countries have enforced their insider trading laws at least once.  This 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Average Tobin’s Q is higher for the 
firms in civil law countries than for the firms in common law countries, and the 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Finally, mean sales growth, a proxy 
for investment opportunities, is not significantly different between the common law and 
civil law firms.   
Table 5 presents simple correlations highlighting the relationship between Tobin’s 
Q and several key variables.  Tobin’s Q is positively correlated with ITL (correlation 
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coefficient of 0.09 and 5% statistical significance) and Enforced (correlation coefficient 
of 0.11 and 1% statistical significance).  Although they are not large, these correlations 
are consistent with H1, which predicts a positive relationship between insider trading law 
and corporate valuation (see Table 1).  Tobin’s Q is also positively correlated with sales 
growth (correlation coefficient of 0.23 and 1% statistical significance).  While the 
magnitudes of the foregoing correlation coefficients are not large, they are consistent 
with ex ante expectations.  Controlling for other factors that may affect corporate 
valuation, multivariable regression analysis will reveal whether the positive association 
between Tobin’s Q and insider trading laws withstands deeper scrutiny. 
IV. Methodology and Regression Results  
 
A.  Methodology 
 
 To test Hypotheses 1 and 2 (H1 and H2), I estimate variations on the following 
basic regression: 
Tobin’s Q = B0 + B1SalesGrowth + B2ITL + B3Ownership + B4ITL*Ownership + e 
 
where Tobin’s Q (the dependent variable) is a measure of corporate valuation, 
SalesGrowth is the average annual rate of sales growth for to the previous three years, 
ITL is the insider trading law index, Ownership is the controlling shareholder’s financial 
stake (cash flow rights) in the firm, and ITL*Ownership is the product of the two 
previous variables.  H1 predicts that BB2 will be positive, while H2 predicts that B4 B will be 
negative.  I also report alternative specifications to the basic regression, as explained 
below.  I consider a coefficient to be statistically significant if it is at least significant at 
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 I use random effects maximum likelihood estimation because the errors are not 
independent within countries and this methodology takes both within and between 
country variation into account, adjusting the standard errors to reflect the correlation 
among observations from the same country.  In all of the regressions reported below, the 
dependent variable is the log of 1 plus Tobin’s Q.  I take the log of Tobin’s Q because its 
distribution is skewed to the right, and a log transformation of Tobin’s Q yields a more 
normal distribution.  Each firm’s Tobin’s Q is adjusted by industry, i.e., for each firm 
Tobin’s Q equals its Tobin’s Q minus the world-wide median Tobin’s Q for all of the 
firms in the same industry.  The rationale for this adjustment is to eliminate industry-
specific components of valuation. 
B.  Results 
 
 Table 6 presents the results of random effects regressions.  The regressions in 
Panel A use the insider trading law index, ITL, while the regressions in Panel B use the 
interaction term, ITL*Enforced.  In all of the regressions in both panels, the coefficient on 
sales growth is positive and significant.  In column (1) of Panel A, the coefficient on ITL 
is positive, consistent with H1 (see Table 1); however, it is statistically insignificant.  In 
column (2) of Panel A, the coefficient on cash flow ownership of the controlling 
shareholder is positive and significant at the 10% level.  In column (3) of Panel A, the 
coefficient on the interaction, ITL*Enforced and cash flow ownership is positive and 
significant at the 10% level, suggesting that cash flow ownership and insider trading laws 
are complementary.  This result is inconsistent with H2 (the “Substitution” Hypothesis), 
which predicts a negative coefficient on the interaction between ITL and cash flow 
ownership (see Table 1).  Finally, none of the coefficients on the independent variables, 
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except sales growth, are statistically significant when I include them jointly in a single 
regression in column (4) of Panel A.30  The regressions in Panel B, which replaces ITL 
with ITL*Enforced but are otherwise identical to the regressions in Panel A, yield similar 
results to those in Panel A. 
 It may be inappropriate to lump all of the firms together, as I do in Table 6, 
without allowing for heterogeneity – that is, systematic differences in the effect of insider 
trading laws on agency costs – among the sample firms.  Prior research has shown that 
financial markets and corporate governance structures differ significantly between 
common law and civil law countries (see, e.g., La Porta et al. 1997, 1998).  Consistent 
with this research, I find significant differences by legal origin among the firms and 
countries in my sample.  For instance, the common law firms tend to have significantly 
more liquid shares than the civil law firms.  In addition, the ownership and control stakes 
of controlling shareholders tend to be more closely aligned in the common law firms than 
in the civil law firms.  Moreover, controlling shareholders are more likely to be 
corporations (as opposed to families, the state or financial institutions) in the common 
law firms relative to the civil law firms.  Finally, the common law countries have 
significantly greater investor protections (as measured by La Porta et al.’s (1998) original 
anti-director rights index), a significantly greater frequency of insider trading law 
enforcement (as measured by the variable Enforced), significantly more liquid stock 
markets, and a significantly greater frequency of corporate acquisitions relative to the 
civil law countries.   
 Therefore, I allow for heterogeneity between the common law and civil law firms 
by interacting the variables of interest with the dummy variable for common law origin in 
                                                 




Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007
a new set of regressions.31  I also address multicollinearity between ITL and the 
interaction terms by centering ITL on its sample mean.  The dependent variable is still the 
log of 1 plus Tobin’s Q, where, as explained above, Tobin’s Q is adjusted by industry.  
The independent variables are sales growth, cash flow ownership, centered-ITL, and 
several interaction terms between common law origin and various other variables that I 
explain as I present the results.  The results are reported in Table 7.   
 In column (1) of Table 7, the coefficient on centered-ITL is negative but 
insignificant, while the coefficient on the interaction between centered-ITL and common 
law is positive and significant at the 1% level.  The regression in column (2) is the same 
as the regression in column (1), except that in column (2) I control for common law 
origin.  This has two effects:  Ffirst, the coefficient on centered-ITL becomes significant 
at the 10% level; and second, the net effect of cash flow ownership becomes negative for 
the common law firms.    
 In columns (3) and (4) of Table 7, I replace centered-ITL with the interaction 
between centered-ITL and Enforced.  The results in columns (3) and (4) are consistent 
with those in columns (1) and (2).  The coefficients on the centered-ITL*Enforced are 
negative (albeit insignificant) in columns (3) and (4), while the coefficients on the 
interaction between centered-ITL*Enforced and common law origin are positive and 
significant at the respective 1% and 5% levels for the firms in common law countries.32  
The regressions in Table 7 also suggest that although cash flow ownership is generally 
                                                 
31 While country fixed effects estimation would be a preferable approach, I am unable to run fixed 
effects regressions because the insider trading law variables already serve as country dummy variables.  
Also, I do not split the sample into common law and civil law firms because that would reduce the variation 
among the independent variables.  Below, I discuss the effect of controlling explicitly for several factors 
that one may expect to differ systematically between the common and civil law countries and firms.    
32 The regression in column (4) differs from the regression in column (3) only in that it controls for 
common law origin.   
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associated with greater corporate valuation, (i.e., cash flow ownership by the controlling 
shareholder has an incentive effect), this effect is stronger for the firms in civil law 
countries than for the firms in common law countries.33  Inconsistent with H2, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms between cash flow ownership and the insider trading 
measures are positive (see rows (8) – (11)), suggesting that cash flow ownership and 
insider trading laws are complements rather than substitutes.  However, these coefficients 
are insignificant.   
 In summary, the results in Table 7 suggest that H1 accurately describes the firms 
in common law countries but that H1 does not accurately describe the firms in civil law 
countries.  Specifically, insider trading laws are associated positively with corporate 
valuation for the firms in common law countries (see rows (4) and (5) of Table 7).  In 
contrast, for the firms in civil law countries, insider trading laws are (at best) irrelevant to 
corporate valuation (see row (3) of Table 7) and (at worst) negatively associated with 
corporate valuation (see row (2) of Table 7).  While cash flow ownership of the 
controlling shareholder is generally positively associated with corporate valuation for the 
firms in civil law countries, the results on cash flow ownership are mixed for the firms in 
common law countries.  Finally, inconsistent with H2, there does not appear to be a 
substitution effect between insider trading law and the controlling shareholder’s equity 
stake in the firm.  To the contrary, the coefficients in rows (8) through (11) in Table 7 
suggest that, if anything, there is a complementary relationship between cash flow 
ownership and insider trading law.  However, this relationship is statistically 
insignificant. 
                                                 
33 This result is consistent with Durnev and Kim (2005), who find that the incentive effect of cash 




Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007
V.  Robustness Checks 
 
In this section, I address several potential robustness concerns.  First, I investigate 
whether the results robust to controlling for a firm’s industry.  The regressions in Tables 
7 and 8 do not control for industry.  However, corporate valuation may vary 
systematically by industry.  (see, e.g., Demsetz and Lehn 1985).  Industry variation in 
corporate valuation may result in some industries being inherently more prone than others 
to private benefits extraction.  (i.e., “amenity potential”, according to Demsetz and Lehn 
1985).  Another reason for industry variation in valuation may stem from different 
industries being at different stages of growth.  (La Porta et al. 2002).  Thus, a common 
approach in the literature is to control for industry in corporate valuation regressions.  
(see, e.g., Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Morck et al. 1988; and Claessens, et al. 2002).  I add 
industry dummies to the regressions and substitute La Porta et al.’s (2002) industry 
adjusted sales growth variable for the raw sales growth measure.  La Porta et al. (2002) 
define industry adjusted sales growth as the difference between the firm’s sales growth 
and the world median sales growth among firms in the same industry.  Using industry 
adjusted sales growth instead of raw sales growth controls for the possibility “that 
different industries may be at different stages of maturity and growth that determine their 
valuations.”  (La Porta et al. 2002, p. 1159).   
 Second, I address the potential endogeneity of corporate ownership.  Thus far, I 
have assumed that the controlling shareholder’s ownership stake is exogenous, i.e., 
determined independently of the country’s insider trading laws.  This assumption may be 
incorrect.  La Porta et al. (1998) show that ownership tends to be more concentrated in 
countries with weak investor protections than in countries with strong investor 
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protections.  Similarly, in other work I show that ownership concentration is greater in 
countries with lax insider trading laws than in countries with stringent insider trading 
laws, controlling for legal origin, anti-director rights, and other factors relevant to 
ownership concentration (Beny 2005).  If the controlling shareholder’s ownership stake is 
endogenous to the country’s legal rules governing financial markets, the results in Table 
7 may be biased.  I address this issue in the same manner as La Porta et al. (2002).  They 
address the issue by considering only “within-country variation in cash-flow ownership 
(fixed effects estimation), which is arguably more exogenous to the legal regime,” by 
replacing the raw measure of the controlling shareholder’s cash flow ownership with the 
difference between the controlling shareholder’s cash flow ownership at the firm level 
and the country average of the same variable.  (La Porta et al. 2002, p. 1166).  
The results of the foregoing adjustments are presented in Table 8.  A comparison 
of Tables 7 and 8 reveals that the results are essentially the same after I make these 
adjustments.  The major differences between Tables 7 and 8 are that: (1) most of the 
statistically significant coefficients in Table 7 become even more significant in Table 8; 
(2) the coefficient on centered-ITL*Common Law becomes slightly smaller (compare row 
(4) in Table 7 with the same row in Table 8); (3) the coefficients on centered-
ITL*Enforced*Common Law decrease in magnitude (compare row (5) of Table 7 with the 
same row in Table 8); and (4) the positive coefficient on cash flow ownership (row (6) in 
Tables 7 and 8) becomes significant at the 5% level in every regression in Table 8, in 
contrast to Table 7, where the coefficient on cash flow ownership (row (6)) is 
insignificant in column (1) and significant at only the 10% level in column (2).  
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Another concern is whether the results are influenced by omitted variables.  As 
discussed above, heterogeneity in the relationship between insider trading laws and 
corporate valuation among the sample firms may result from systematic differences 
between common law and civil law countries in factors relevant to the relationship 
between insider trading laws and corporate valuation.  These factors include various 
financial, market, regulatory and institutional characteristics.  In Table 7, I addressed this 
issue by interacting the insider trading law and ownership variables with common law 
origin.  However, if the data are available, it is preferable to control directly for the 
relevant factors that may systematically differ between common law and civil law 
countries.   
 I address omitted variables by explicitly controlling for several potentially 
relevant financial, market, regulatory and institutional characteristics of the sample 
countries and firms, including: (1) enforcement environment and judicial efficiency; (2) 
liquidity of the firm’s shares and the stock market; (3) corporate disclosure; (4) market 
participants’ perception of the severity of insider trading in the stock market; (5) the 
firm’s control structure and the strength of the country’s corporate law; (6) the market for 
corporate control; and (7) the controlling shareholder’s identity.  I explain the rationale 
and effect of controlling for each of these factors in turn.34
 First, the results may derive from the general quality of the legal system rather 
than insider trading law if countries with more stringent insider trading laws also have 
more stringent enforcement, stronger rule of law, or more efficient judiciaries than 
countries with less stringent insider trading laws.35  I alternately control for each of these 
                                                 
34 I do not present the results in the interest of brevity. 
35 Beny’s (2005) evidence suggests that this is the case. 
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country characteristics using the following variables:  the dummy variable Enforced, 
which is a dummy variable equal to one if the country enforced its insider trading law for 
the first time by 1994 and zero otherwise; a measure of the rule of law from La Porta et 
al. (1998); and an index of judicial efficiency from La Porta et al. (1998).  Table 2 
describes these variables in greater detail.  The results are robust to controlling for each 
of these variables. 
Second, the different relationship between insider trading laws and valuation 
between the common law and civil law firms may result from systematic differences in 
share liquidity between the two legal systems.  Specifically, if common law firms tend to 
have more liquid shares than civil law firms, and if there is a positive relationship 
between stock market liquidity and insider trading laws,36 the positive relationship 
observed between valuation and insider trading laws among the common law firms may 
stem from the fact that these firms have more liquid shares than civil law firms37 since 
investors are willing to pay a liquidity premium.  (Amiuhud and Mendelson 1986; La 
Porta et al. 2002).   
 I investigate the effect of liquidity by controlling for both stock market liquidity 
and individual firm liquidity using data from the World Bank and Datastream.  Both 
liquidity measures are described in detail in Table 2.  These data confirm that both stock 
                                                 
36 Georgakopoulos (1993) argues that it is only when the stock market becomes sufficiently liquid 
that there is adequate social demand for insider trading regulation.  Beny’s (2007b) finding that countries 
with more liquid stock markets are more likely to pass and enforce insider trading laws than countries with 
less liquid stock markets is consistent with this claim.  The explanation could be that insider trading is more 
profitable and thus more likely to occur the more liquid is the stock market, other things equal (Maug 
2002).  But see Bhide (1993), who argues that causality runs from insider trading laws to liquidity, rather 
than the reverse.  (Bhide 1993).  In any event, stock markets do tend to be more liquid in countries with 
more stringent insider trading laws and enforcement.  (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Beny (2005, 2007a). 
37 Civil law firms’ shares may be relatively illiquid because ownership is more concentrated among 
these firms.  According to Bhide (1993), “when stockholding is fully diffuse, the firm’s stock is likely to be 
the most liquid.” (Bhide 1993, pp. 45-46).  Consistent with this claim, Eleswarapu and Krishnamurti (1999) 
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markets and individual firm stocks are more liquid in the common law sample 
countries.38  As expected, the coefficients on both stock market liquidity and firm 
liquidity are positive and significant in the Tobin’s Q regressions.  However, the results 
are robust to controlling for both liquidity measures.39
 Third, the regressions in Table 7 do not control for the quality of corporate 
disclosure.  Academics and lawmakers have long noted the close relationship between 
disclosure rules and insider trading laws.  More punctual and higher quality disclosure 
ought to reduce insiders’ opportunity to trade profitably relative to the rest of the market. 
(Baiman and Verrecchia 1996; Fried 1997; Maug 2002; Shin 1996).40  I control for two 
measures of disclosure.  First, I control for the quality of accounting standards, as 
reported in La Porta et al. (1998).  This index ranks countries according to the quality of 
their corporate disclosure practices as of 1990.  Second, I control for a measure of legal 
disclosure requirements, constructed by La Porta et al. (2006).  This index measures how 
much corporate governance-relevant information firms are legally required to include in 
their offering prospectuses.  I describe both disclosure variables in more detail in Table 2.  
Alternately controlling for these disclosure variables has no effect on the results reported 
above. 
                                                 
38 Ownership (of the controlling shareholder) is also more concentrated among the civil law firms 
(see Table 4). 
39 La Porta et al. (2002) address liquidity indirectly by investigating whether the sample firms that have 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) traded in the U.S. have higher valuations than those without ADRs.  
They find a small positive effect of ADRs for the common law firms but not for the civil law firms, which 
is “inconsistent with the view that liquidity drives [their finding that valuation is greater for common law 
firms than for civil law firms] since, on that theory, the benefit of an ADR for valuation ought to be higher 
in less liquid markets (in civil law countries).”  (La Porta et al. 2002, p. 1165).   
40 Indeed, an important pillar of U.S. insider trading legislation is the “disclose or abstain” rule, 
which requires that insiders either disclose material nonpublic information or refrain from trading on the 
basis of such information.  Several other countries effectively follow the “disclose or abstain” approach. 
 28
30
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 61 [2007]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art61
 Fourth, the results may arise because I do not control for the public perception of 
insider trading.  A perception that insider trading is more prevalent in common law 
countries may explain why insider trading regulation is more strongly and positively 
associated with corporate valuation in such countries.  To address this issue, I control for 
the perception of insider trading, using a measure from the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report (1996), which is described in Table 2.  Controlling for 
the perception of insider trading does not alter the results.  In fact, for the countries in my 
sample, the public perception of insider trading is greater among the civil law countries 
than among the common law countries.  This would seem to suggest a plausible 
alternative interpretation of the results; namely, that insider trading laws are perceived to 
be less effective in civil law countries.  That is, holding constant the public perception of 
insider trading activity, the investing public may view insider trading regulations to be 
less effective at controlling such activity in civil law countries than in common law 
countries.  However, it may also mean that there are offsetting benefits to insider trading 
in civil law countries.  I discuss these issues in more detail below.   
 Fifth, the results may result from systematic differences in controlling 
shareholders’ incentives and ability to extract private benefits.  Such differences may 
result from systematic differences in corporate control structures, corporate laws, or some 
combination thereof, between civil law and common law countries.  Consider Maug’s 
(2002) theoretical framework in which large shareholders face a tradeoff between 
monitoring and engaging in insider trading.41  Other things equal, the greater the 
                                                 
41 Managers may bribe large shareholders not to monitor by giving them private information on 
which they can profitably trade.  (Maug 2002).  If large shareholders’ marginal payoffs from trading are 
greater than their marginal payoffs from monitoring, at the margin they will choose trading over 
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controlling shareholder’s incentives and ability to extract private benefits, the more likely 
she is to trade rather than to monitor at the margin.42  Two characteristics that have a 
strong influence on the controlling shareholder’s incentives and ability to extract private 
benefits are the firm’s control structure and the country’s corporate laws.43  I therefore 
control for both of these characteristics.  
 I use one firm-specific and one country-specific proxy for the controlling 
shareholder’s incentives and ability to extract private benefits.  As a proxy for the 
controlling shareholder’s incentives to extract private benefits I use the “control wedge”, 
which is the divergence between the controlling shareholder’s control and ownership 
stakes from La Porta et al. (2002).44  The larger the control wedge, the greater the 
deviation from one-share-one-vote, and thus the greater the controlling shareholder’s 
incentives and ability to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.  
(Grossman and Hart 1988; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988; Harris and Raviv 1988; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis 2000; and La Porta et al. 
2002).  Consistent with this, empirical research has shown that there is a tradeoff between 
ownership and control, with corporate valuation increasing in the controlling 
shareholder’s cash flow ownership (the incentive effect) and decreasing in the controlling 
shareholder’s voting control (the entrenchment effect).  (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
                                                 
42 However, for this logic to explain the results in Tables 7 and 8, it ought to be the case that 
controlling shareholders have greater incentives to expropriate private benefits in the common law 
countries.  But that does not describe the empirical pattern revealed in the law and finance literature. 
43 La Porta et al. (2002) find that common law origin and stronger anti-director rights are associated 
with higher corporate valuation for their same sample of firms.  My results may be driven by anti-director 
rules rather than by insider trading laws, if countries that have stricter anti-self-dealing corporate laws also 
tend to have more stringent insider trading laws. Indeed, they do for this sample.  The correlation 
coefficients are 0.36 (significance 1%) between the original anti-director rights index (La Porta et al. 1998) 
and ITL; 0.27 (significance 1%) between the revised anti-director rights index (Djankov et al. (2006)) and 
ITL; and 0.44 (significance 1%) between the anti-self-dealing (Djankov et al. (2006)) index. 
44 I use two measures of the control wedge, the arithmetic difference and the ratio between the 
controlling owner’s control and ownership stakes.  The results are the same with either measure. 
 30
32
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 61 [2007]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art61
1988; Claessens et al. 2002; Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung 2000; and Durnev and Kim 
2005).   
 As a proxy for the ability to extract private benefits, I use three measures of the 
stringency of a country’s corporate laws:  La Porta et al.’s (1998) original anti-director 
rights index; (2) Djankov et al.’s (2006) revised anti-director rights index; and (3) 
Djankov et al.’s (2006) anti-self-dealing index.  Alternately controlling for the control 
wedge and each investor protection variable does not alter the results.  In fact, the insider 
trading law variables overcome La Porta et al.’s (1998) original anti-director rights index 
and Djankov et al.’s (2006) revised anti-director rights and anti-self-dealing indices.  The 
coefficients on the insider trading law variables remain positive and significant for the 
common law sample firms, while the coefficients on the anti-director and anti-self-
dealing variables are insignificant.  
 Sixth, it may be inappropriate to ignore the market for corporate control, as I do in 
Table 7.  Corporate takeovers provide a fertile (and common) context for insider 
trading.45  The more competitive the market for corporate control, the greater the 
potential profits from trading on the basis of private information about an impending 
takeover, since greater competition increases takeover premia.  (Burkart et al. 1998).  The 
market for corporate control is less competitive when control is more closely held, as it 
tends to be among firms in civil law countries.  (see, e.g., Dyck and Zingales 2004; and 
Nenova 2003).  In addition, hold-out problems are less severe when ownership is more 
                                                 
45 Two recent studies that document insider trading around corporate takeovers are Ackerman and 
Maug (2006) and Bris (2005).   Bris (2005) studies the relationship between the profitability of insider 
trading around corporate takeovers and insider trading law and enforcement and finds that insider trading is 
less profitable when the law is more stringent.  Ackerman and Maug (2006) study the relationship between 
insider trading laws and enforcement and the predictability of takeover announcement returns and find that 
there is less private information trading in stock markets governed by more stringent insider trading laws.  
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concentrated, as it tends to be in firms in civil law countries, driving down the price of 
corporate acquisitions.  For these reasons, corporate takeovers may present less lucrative 
trading opportunities in civil law countries, other things equal.  In short, if the market for 
corporate control is less competitive in civil law countries than in common law countries, 
this may partly explain the apparent irrelevance of insider trading laws to corporate 
valuation in the sample civil law firms.46   
 Therefore, I control for three measures of the market for corporate control.  First, 
I control for the average percent of acquisitions that were successful between January 1, 
1990 and December 31, 1999 from Bris (2005).  Second, I control for the ratio of the 
average per capita market value of acquisitions in constant U.S. dollars between January 
1, 1990 and December 31, 1999 from Bris (2005) to GDP in 1995 U.S. dollars.  Finally, I 
control for the average percent of acquisitions that were hostile between January 1, 1990 
and December 31, 1999 from Bris (2005).   In addition to the preceding measures of the 
market for corporate control, I also use the mean and median values of the block 
premium as a percentage of firm equity value from Dyck and Zingales (2004).  Dyck and 
Zingales (2004) use the block premium to infer the private benefits of control across 
countries.  The block premium may also be a proxy for the degree of competition in the 
market for corporate control, a higher (lower) block premium suggesting less (more) 
competition in the market for corporate control.  Bris’ (2005) corporate control and Dyck 
and Zingales’ (2004) block premia data are described in greater detail in Table 2.  
                                                 
46 Bris’ (2005) data suggest that the likelihood of a corporate takeover is greater in common law 
countries, although the relative market value of a corporate takeover seems to be larger in civil law 
countries.  It is unclear which way this information cuts. 
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Alternately controlling for these measures of the market for corporate control and the 
block premium does not alter the results.47   
 Seventh, the identity of the controlling shareholder may be relevant insofar as 
different controlling shareholders may have different incentives to extract private benefits 
of control.  For example, a controlling shareholder that is a family may have stronger 
incentives to engage in insider trading than a controlling shareholder that is a 
corporation.48  Perhaps civil law and common law countries have a differential 
prevalence of types of controlling shareholders.  Thus, I control for the controlling 
shareholder’s identity using La Porta et al.’s (2002) data (see Table 2).  This does not 
change the results.   
 The results are also robust to controlling for GDP per capita.  In fact, the civil law 
countries of my sample have slightly higher average GDP per capita than the common 
law countries, although the difference is statistically insignificant.  Finally, I check 
whether any country drives the results by sequentially dropping each country from the 
regressions in Table 7.  No single country drives the results. 
VI. Conclusion  
This article yields two main findings.  First, for the sample firms in common law 
countries, insider trading laws and enforcement are positively associated with higher 
corporate valuation.  This evidence supports the claim that insider trading laws and their 
enforcement may help to mitigate agency costs.  In contrast, the relationship between 
                                                 
47 None of the coefficients on Bris’ (2005) acquisition measures is significant.  However, the 
coefficients on Dyck and Zingales’ (2004) block premia measures – mean block premium and median 
block premium – are negative and significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
48 Hung and Trezevant (2004) find that insiders of Southeast Asian firms that are controlled by the 
wealthiest families seem to be especially aggressive in trading on inside information.  Their data are for 
firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.  My sample does not include firms from any of 
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valuation and insider trading law is negative (but generally insignificant) for the firms in 
civil law countries.  Second, the results do not support the notion that cash flow 
ownership and insider trading laws are substitute means to control agency costs.  If 
anything, the results suggest that insider trading laws and equity ownership are 
complementary ways to mitigate agency costs, although this finding is generally 
statistically insignificant.   
 The result that insider trading laws are positively associated with corporate 
valuation in the common law but not in the civil law countries, even though I control for 
many relevant characteristics that may systematically differ between common and civil 
law countries, is puzzling.  There are at least two possible explanations for this result.  
The first potential explanation is an economic rationale.  Demsetz (1986) and Bhide 
(1993) suggest that insider trading laws may have a perverse effect on corporate value by 
reducing large shareholders’ incentives to engage in corporate monitoring because these 
laws reduce insider trading profits, which compensate for such monitoring.  Perhaps the 
results can be seen in this light; that is, insider trading laws may discourage large 
shareholders from monitoring in civil law countries but not in common law countries.  
The negative relationship between insider trading laws and corporate valuation among 
the civil law firms is generally statistically insignificant, however, which is inconsistent 
with Demsetz' (1986) and Bhide's (1993) hypothesis.  Instead, the results suggest that 
insider trading laws may have a beneficial impact on monitoring at best and no effect at 
worst. 
 The second potential explanation for the difference between common law and 
civil law firms is a legal/institutional rationale.  More specifically, insider trading laws 
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may be relatively ineffective in civil law countries.  Indeed, recent research suggests that 
insider trading laws are less effective in countries where investor protections are 
relatively weaker, as in civil law countries.  Durnev and Nain (2005) argue that, where 
investor protection is sufficiently weak and controlling shareholders are prohibited from 
trading, these shareholders may compensate for lost trading profits by engaging in 
various covert forms of expropriation.  In addition, Durnev and Nain (2005) find that if 
investor protection is sufficiently weak, “private information trading may remain 
unchanged and even increase in the presence of insider trading restrictions.”  (Durnev and 
Nain 2005, p. 22).49  Similarly, Grishchenko et. al. (2002) find that “stocks…that provide 
better investor protection [and information disclosure] exhibit less private information 
trading.”  In contrast, Durnev and Nain (2005) find that insider trading laws 
unambiguously reduce private information trading “in countries where shareholder rights 
are well protected.”  (Durnev and Nain 2005, p. 22).50  Furthermore, Bhattacharya and 
Daouk (2005) suggest that the cost of equity may actually increase when a country 
merely enacts, but does not enforce, insider trading legislation.   
 The problem with the legal/institutional explanation is that the common law-civil 
law dichotomy that I find is robust to controlling for various legal and institutional 
differences among the countries in my sample.  Nevertheless, the robustness of the 
dichotomy may be due to the fact that the existing legal and institutional measures are not 
good variables.  If that is the case, comparative law and finance scholars ought to 
                                                 
49 According to Durnev and Nain (2005), “[t]he opaque informational environment that often 
accompanies covert activities of controlling shareholders can, in turn, increase the information acquisition 
activity of market professionals who trade at the expense of uninformed investors.”  (Durnev and Nain 
2005, p. 25). 
50  Similarly, Ackerman and Maug's (2005) evidence suggests that insider trading laws have a greater 
impact “in countries with more effective” judicial systems.  But there is no reason to expect judiciaries to 
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construct more direct measures of the legal order and particularly the securities regulatory 
and enforcement environment.  (see La Porta et al. 2005 for a comparative study of 
securities laws and enforcement). 
 Over the past two decades, there has been a concerted international effort to 
encourage countries to adopt insider trading laws and to vigorously enforce such laws.  
(Haddock and Macey, 1986; Gevurtz, 2002).  However, the results of this article suggest 
that insider trading laws are not uniformly associated with corporate valuation, a proxy 
for agency costs, across countries.  Indeed, the results suggest that insider trading laws 
may not be an effective way to reduce agency costs in civil law countries.  Moreover, the 
costs of insider trading laws may well exceed their benefits in civil law countries.  
Consequently, this article’s results could be read to support contractualists who oppose a 
one-size-fits-all approach (i.e., a mandatory prohibition) to insider trading.  (Carlton and 
Fischel 1983; Haddock and Macey 1987; and Epstein 2004).  
 ,Such a reading of the results of this article is unwarranted, however.  If the 
contractualists are to bear the burden of proving that mandatory insider trading laws 
exacerbate agency costs, they must show that more stringent insider trading laws have a 
significantly negative impact on corporate valuation.51  The evidence in this Article does 
not support such a claim.  In addition, private contractual approaches to insider trading 
are inherently problematic because of transaction costs, uncertainty, and externalities,52 
                                                 
51 The near-universal illegality of insider trading arguably places the burden on opponents of insider trading 
regulation to show that such regulation is more costly than beneficial, since they seek to change the status 
quo. 
52  Negative externalities are an especially important consideration in the insider trading debate, 
which both this article and much of the agency literature on insider trading abstract from.  Studies that 
address some potential negative external effects of insider trading include Baiman and Verrechhia (1996); 
Beny (2005, 2007); Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002); Bushman et al. (2005); Cox (1986); Du and Wei 
(2004); Fishman and Hagerty (1992); Georgakopoulos (1993); Goshen and Parchomovsky (2001); Klock 
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and may be unenforceable by private parties.  (see, e.g., Easterbrook 1985; Cox 1986).  
Furthermore, the apparent insignificance of insider trading laws to firms in civil law 
countries may stem from relatively lax enforcement of these laws in civil law countries.  
(see Jackson and Roe 2006).  If that is the case, the appropriate policy response may be 
greater sanctions and more stringent enforcement, not repeal of insider trading laws, in 
the latter countries.   
 Ultimately, the results of this article suggest that the firm-level impact of insider 
trading laws may depend on the local context in which such laws are applied (or not 
applied, as the case may be).  
                                                                                                                                                 
(1994); Kraakman (1991); and Shin (1996).  Glaeser et al. (2001) address the general issue of public versus 
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Dependent Variable Hypothesized Relationship to 
Corporate Value 
 
H1 Insider Trading Law 
 
Positive 
H2 Cash Flow 





H3 Insider Trading 
Law*Cash Flow 
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Table 2: Description of Variables 
 




Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of assets divided by their replacement value at the close of the most 
recent fiscal year.  The market value of assets is measured by the book value of assets minus the book value 
equity minus deferred taxes plus the market value of common stock.  The replacement value of assets is 





The industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q for a given firm is defined as the difference between that firm’s Tobin’s Q 
and the world median Tobin’s Q among firms in the same industry.  Industry reference groups are defined at 
the three-digit S.I.C. level if there are at least five WorldScope firms (not including the sample firms) in the 
group and, if not, at the two-digit S.I.C. level.  La Porta et al. (2002). 
 
Cash Flow to 
Price Ratio 
The cash flow to price ratio is computed as the sum of earnings (net income before extraordinary items) and 
depreciation.  When cash flow is negative, the cash flow to price ratio is assigned a missing value.  The 
average cash flow to price ratio for the three most recent fiscal years is reported in US dollars.  Price, in US 




Flow to Price 
Ratio 
The industry-adjusted cash flow to price ratio is defined as the difference between the firm’s cash flow to 
price ratio and the world median cash flow to price ratio among firms in the same industry.  Industry control 
groups are defined in the same manner as for industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (see above).  La Porta et al. (2002). 
 
 Insider Trading Law Variables
Tipping Tipping equals one if corporate insiders are prohibited from tipping outsiders (tippees) about material non-
public information and/or encouraging them to trade on such information for personal gain; equals zero 
otherwise.  Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996). 
Tippee Tippee equals one if tippees, like corporate insiders, are prohibited from trading on material non-public 
information that they have received from corporate insiders; equals zero otherwise.  Gaillard (1992); Stamp 
and Welsh (1996). 
Damages Damages equals one if potential monetary penalties for violating insider trading laws are proportional to 
insiders’ trading profits; equals zero otherwise.  Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996). 
Criminal Criminal equals one if violation of insider trading laws is a potential criminal offense; equals zero otherwise. 
Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996). 
Private Private equals one if private parties have a private right of action against parties who have violated the 
country’s insider trading laws.  Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996). 
ITL The aggregate insider trading law index, ITL, equals the sum of (1) Tipping; (2) Tippee; (3) Damages; and 
(4) Criminal; and (5) Private.  Equivalently, the sum of Scope, Sanction and Private.  IT Law ranges from 0 
to 5, with 0 representing the most lax formal insider trading law and 5 representing the most restrictive 
insider trading law.  Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996).     
Enforced A proxy for actual enforcement, Enforced by 1994 is an indicator variable that equals one if the country’s 
insider trading law has been enforced for the first time by the end of 1994.  Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). 
ITL*Enforced IT Law times Enforced by 1994. 
 Ownership and Control Variables
Control Rights “The fraction of the firm’s voting rights, if any, owned by its controlling shareholder.  To measure control we 
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held by entities that, in turn, she controls) voting rights in the firm.  A shareholder has an x percent indirect 
control over firm A if: (1) she controls directly firm B which, in turn, directly controls x percent of the votes 
in firm A; or (2) she controls directly firm C which in turn controls firm B (or a sequence of firms leading to 
firm B each of which has control over the next one, i.e., they form a control chain) which, in turn, directly 
controls x percent of the votes in firm A.  A group of n companies form a chain of control if each firm 1 
through n - 1 controls the consecutive firm.  A firm in our sample has a controlling shareholder if the sum of 
her direct and indirect voting rights exceeds 10 percent.  When two or more shareholders meet our criteria for 





“Ultimate cash flow right of the controlling shareholder in the sample firm.  CF Rights are computed as the 
product of all the equity stakes along the control chain (see description of Control Rights for an explanation 





Calculated by taking the difference between the cash flow ownership of the controlling owner of a given firm 
and the countrywide mean cash flow ownership of controlling shareholders.  La Porta et al. (2002). 
 Additional Variables
Sales Growth Sales growth is computed by the geometric average annual percentage growth in lagged net sales for up to 3 





Industry adjusted sales growth is defined as the difference between the firm’s sales growth (GS) and the 
world median GS among firms in the same industry. Industry control groups are defined in the same manner 
as for industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (see above).  La Porta et al. (2002). 
 
Common Law A dummy variable that equals one if the legal origin of the country is English common law and zero 
otherwise.  La Porta et al. (1998); CIA (2000). 
 
Industry Industry reference groups are defined at the three-digit S.I.C. level if there are at least five WorldScope firms 
(not including the sample firms) in the group and, if not, at the two-digit S.I.C. level.  La Porta et al. (2002). 
 
Rule of Law The rule of law measure is an “[a]ssessment of the law and order tradition in the country.  Average of the 
months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995.  Scale from 0 to 10, with lower 
scores for less tradition for law and order.”  La Porta et al. (1998) compile this variable from the 
International Country Risk Guide.  A higher rule of law score signifies that the legal system is relatively 




The index of judicial efficiency is an “[a]ssessment of the ‘efficiency and integrity of the legal environment 
as it affects business, particularly foreign firms,’” averaged from 1980-1983.  La Porta et al. (1998) get this 




Stock market liquidity is measured as stock market value traded divided by GDP.  World Bank World 
Development Indicators (1995). 
Firm Liquidity Individual firm liquidity is measured as the average monthly turnover ratio, i.e., the total value traded divided 





The Disclosure index equals the arithmetic average of 6 separate indices of information that firms are legally 
required to include in their prospectuses: (1) Compensation; (2) Shareholders; (3) Inside Ownership; (4) 
Irregular contracts; (5) Transactions.   
(1) Compensation is “[a]n index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the compensation of 
directors and key officers.  Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the compensation of each 
director and key officer be reported in the prospectus of a newly-listed firm; equals one-half if only the 
aggregate compensation of directors and key officers must be reported in the prospectus of a newly-listed 
firm; equals zero when there is no requirement to disclose the compensation of directors and key officers in 
the prospectus for a newly-listed firm.”   
(2) Shareholders is “[a]n index of disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer’s equity ownership structure.  
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Equals one if the law or the listing rules require disclosing the name and ownership stake of each shareholder 
who, directly or indirectly, controls ten percent or more of the Issuer’s voting securities; equals one-half if 
reporting requirements for the Issuer’s 10% shareholders do not include indirect ownership or if only their 
aggregate ownership needs to be disclosed; equals zero when the law does not require disclosing the name 
and ownership stake of the Issuer’s 10% shareholders.  No distinction is drawn between large-shareholder 
reporting requirements imposed on firms and those imposed on large shareholders themselves.”   
(3) Inside Ownership is “[a]n index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the equity ownership of 
the Issuer’s shares by its directors and key officers.  Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the 
ownership of the Issuer’s shares by each of its directors and key officers be disclosed in the prospectus; 
equals one-half if only the aggregate number of the Issuer’s shares owned by its directors and key officers 
must be disclosed in the prospectus; equals zero when the ownership of Issuer’s shares by its directors and 
key officers need not be disclosed in the prospectus.” 
(4) Irregular contracts is “[a]n index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer’s contracts 
outside the ordinary course of business. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the terms of 
material contracts made by the Issuer outside the ordinary course of its business be disclosed in the 
prospectus; equals one-half if the terms of only some material contracts made outside the ordinary course of 
business must be disclosed; equals zero otherwise.” 
(5) Transactions is “[a]n index of the prospectus disclosure requirements regarding transactions between the 
Issuer and its directors, officers, and/or large shareholders (i.e., “related parties”).  Equals one if the law or 
the listing rules require that all transactions in which related parties have, or will have, an interest be 
disclosed in the prospectus; equals one-half if only some transactions between the Issuer and related parties 
must be disclosed in the prospectus; equals zero if transactions between the Issuer and related parties need 
not be disclosed in the prospectus.”  La Porta et al. (2003) 
Accounting 
Standards Index 
The accounting index is a measure of the quality of accounting standards.  The accounting index assigns a 
rating to companies’ 1990 annual reports on the basis of their inclusion or exclusion of 90 items.  The 90 
items are divided into 7 categories (general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow 
statement, accounting standards, stock data and special items).  For each country, the index is based on 
examination of a minimum of 3 companies.  The companies represent a cross-section of various industries.  
Seventy percent are industrial companies, while the remaining thirty percent are financial companies.  La 
Porta et al. (1998).  
Perception of 
Insider Trading 
The perception of insider trading is based on a survey that asks corporate executives many questions, 
including whether insider trading is common in their domestic stock markets.  The variable ranges from one 
to six, with one indicating that corporate executives strongly agree, and six indicating that corporate 
executives strongly disagree, that insider trading is common in their domestic stock markets.  World 
Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report (1996). 
 
Control Wedge The control wedge is the difference between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights.  




The original anti-director rights index is “[f]ormed by adding 1 when: (1) the country allows shareholders to 
mail the proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general 
shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of 
directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share 
capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders meeting is less than or equal to 10 
percent (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a 




The revised anti-director rights index “relies on the same basic dimensions of corporate law [as the original 
anti-director rights index] but defines then with more precision.”  “The general principle behind the 
construction of the revised anti-director rights index is to associate better investor protection with laws that 
explicitly mandate, or set as a default rule, provisions that are favorable to minority shareholders.”  Djankov 




The average of the ex-ante and ex-post indices of the private control of self-dealing transactions.  The index 
of ex-ante control of self-dealing transactions is the “[a]verage of approval by disinterested shareholders and 
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in periodic filings and ease of proving wrongdoing.”  Djankov et al. (2006) 




The three measures of the market for corporate control include: (1) the average percent of acquisitions that 
were successful between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1999; (2) the average per capita market value of 
acquisitions in constant U.S. dollars between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1999 divided by GDP in 
1995 U.S. dollars; and (3) the average percent of acquisitions that were hostile between January 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 1999.  The corporate control data come from Bris (2005), whose “total sample includes all 
takeover announcements that took place between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 1999, available in the 
Securities Data Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions database.  Only public companies are considered, and 
[he] exclude[s] LBO deals, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tender and exchange offers, repurchases, minority 
stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, and privatizations.  Second and subsequent bids that 
occur within a window of four years relative to an initial announcement are excluded.  A bid is considered 
Hostile when the board officially rejects the offer but the acquiror persists with the takeover, or if the offer is 
a surprise to the target’s board and the [board] has not yet given a recommendation.  A deal is successful 
when it has been either totally or partially completed” (Bris 2005, Table 1, p. 272).  The GDP data come 
from the World Bank World Development Report CD-Rom (2003). 
 
Block Premium The block premium is “the difference between the price per share paid for the control block and the price on 
the Exchange two days after the announcement of the control transaction, divided by the price on the 
Exchange after the announcement and multiplied by the proportion of cash flow rights represented in the 
controlling block” (Dyck and Zingales 2004, p. 547).  Dyck and Zingales (2004) estimate control block 




This variable is a dummy variable that represents the controlling shareholder’s identity: family, corporation, 
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Table 3 Means and Medians by Insider Trading Regime 
 
The table reports means and medians of key variables by insider trading regime.  Countries with a value of 
ITL*Enforced that is greater than the median of two are classified as High ITL regimes, while those with a 
value of ITL*Enforced that is less than or equal to two are classified as Low ITL regimes.  N is the total 
number of firms observed for each country; ITL is the index of insider trading law; Enforced equals one if 
the country’s insider trading law was enforced at least once before 1994, and zero otherwise; Tobin’s Q is 
Tobin’s Q from La Porta et al. (2002); Cash Flow Ownership is the fraction of common equity owned by 
the controlling shareholder from La Porta et al. (2002); and Sales Growth is the growth of sales, expressed 
in percentage terms, from La Porta et al. (2002).  All variables are described in detail in Table 2.  The 
superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
   











All Countries 537       
Mean  3.22 0.55 1.84 1.56 0.29 0.15 
Median  3 1 2 1.30 0.24 0.12 
Low ITL Regimes        
Australia 20       
Mean  4 0 0 1.41 0.25 0.15 
Median  4 0 0 1.37 0.28 0.15 
Austria 20       
Mean  2 0 0 1.17 0.47 0.13 
Median  2 0 0 1.12 0.51 0.09 
Denmark 20       
Mean  3 0 0 1.92 0.30 0.16 
Median  3 0  0 1.50 0.27 0.11 
Germany 20       
Mean  3 0 0 1.41 0.30 0.12 
Median  3 0 0 1.19 0.27 0.07 
Greece 20       
Mean  2 0 0 1.98 0.48 0.25 
Median  2 0 0 1.67 0.53 0.22 
Ireland 20       
Mean  4 0 0 1.31 0.29 0.15 
Median  4 0 0 1.29 0.18 0.13 
Italy 20       
Mean  3 0 0 1.10 0.35 0.13 
Median   3 0 0 1.03 0.30 0.07 
Japan 20       
Mean  2 1 2 1.66 0.25 0.02 
Median   2 1 2 1.33 0.16 0.01 
Mexico 20       
Mean  1 0 0 1.65 0.36 0.09 
Median   1 0 0 1.64 0.34 -0.04 
New Zealand 20       
Mean  4 0 0 1.53 0.24 0.17 
Median  4 0  0 1.33 0.23 0.17 
Norway 20       
Mean  1 1 1 1.36 0.27 0.16 
Median   1 1 1 1.14 0.23 0.14 
Portugal 20       
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Median   4 0 0 1.09 0.51 0.20 
Spain 20       
Mean  4 0 0 1.18 0.26 0.09 
Median   4 0 0 1.16 0.21 0.05 
Switzerland 20       
Mean  3 0 0 1.71 0.34 0.15 
Median   3 0 0 1.34 0.35 0.11 
Low ITL Overall 280       
Mean  2.86 0.14 0.21 1.47 0.33 0.14 
Median   3 0 0 1.27 0.29 0.10 
High ITL Regimes        
Argentina 19       
Mean  3 1 3 1.25 0.39 0.15 
Median   3 1 3 1.15 0.39 0.13 
Belgium 20       
Mean  3 1 3 1.33 0.29 0.14 
Median   3 1 3 1.22 0.29 0.09 
Canada 20       
Mean  5 1 5 1.97 0.25 0.18 
Median   5 1 5 1.75 0.16 0.17 
Finland 20       
Mean  3 1 3 1.17 0.30 0.16 
Median   3 1 3 1.10 0.23 0.15 
France 20       
Mean  4 1 4 1.38 0.02 0.10 
Median   4 1 4 1.27 0.18 0.08 
Hong Kong 20       
Mean  3 1 3 1.49 0.32 0.16 
Median   3 1 3 1.16 0.27 0.11 
Israel 19       
Mean  3 1 3 1.27 0.24 0.16 
Median   3 1 3 1.17 0.19 0.13 
Netherlands 20       
Mean  3 1 3 2.06 0.33 0.18 
Median   3 1 3 1.74 0.26 0.13 
Singapore 20       
Mean  4 1 4 1.76 0.31 0.23 
Median   4 1 4 1.55 0.29 0.26 
South Korea 19       
Mean  5 1 5 1.14 0.18 0.19 
Median   5 1 5 1.07 0.17 0.21 
Sweden 20       
Mean  3 1 3 1.45 0.12 0.18 
Median   3 1 3 1.21 0.07 0.16 
United Kingdom 20       
Mean  3 1 3 2.15 0.14 0.12 
Median   3 1 3 1.72 0.12 0.10 
United States 20       
Mean  5 1 5 2.98 0.20 0.12 
Median   5 1 5 3.08 0.17 0.10 
High ITL Overall 257       
Mean  3.61 1 3.61 1.65 0.26 0.16 
Median   3 1 3 1.31 0.19 0.13 
Difference of Means 
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(t-statistic) 
Difference of Medians  
Low ITL vs. High ITL 
(Chi2 statistic) 
  
0.34 . 533.00a 0.82 18.30a 6.05a
 




Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007
 
Table 4: Means by Legal Origin 
 
The table reports means and medians of key variables by legal origin, common law or civil law.  N is the 
total number of firms observed for each legal origin; ITL is the index of insider trading law; Enforced 
equals one if the country’s insider trading law was enforced at least once before 1994, and zero otherwise; 
Tobin’s Q is Tobin’s Q from La Porta et al. (2002); Cash Flow Ownership is the fraction of common equity 
owned by the controlling shareholder from La Porta et al. (2002); and Sales Growth is the growth of sales, 
expressed in percentage terms, from La Porta et al. (2002).  All variables are described in detail in Table 2.  
The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 












Common Law 179 2.88 0.50 1.49 1.45 0.25  0.14 
Civil Law 358 1.77 0.25 2.55 1.77 0.32 0.16 
Difference of Means 
Civil Law vs. 
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
 
This table presents pairwise correlation coefficients for Tobin’s Q, the insider trading law and enforcement 
measures (ITL, Enforced, and ITL*Enforced), Cash Flow Ownership and Sales Growth.  All variables are 
described in detail in Table 2.  The numbers in parentheses are the probability levels (p-values) at which the 
null hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected in two-tailed tests.  The superscripts a, b, and c denote 
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Table 6: Random Effects Regressions 
 
The table presents random effects regressions for the dependent variable, Log(1+Tobin’s Q), where Tobin’s 
Q is adjusted by industry, as described in Table 2.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  All 
variables are described in detail in Table 2. 
 
Panel A 














































538 538 538 538 
χ2 25.39 28.46 28.69 28.70 
Prob > χ2 0.00a 0.00a 0.00a 0.00a
 
Panel B 













































537 537 537 537 
Χ2 26.85 28.34 29.28 30.59 
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Table 7: Random Effects Regressions (Heterogeneity) 
  
The table presents random effects regressions for the dependent variable, Log(1+Tobin’s Q), where Tobin’s 
Q is adjusted by industry, as described in Table 2.  C_ITL is mean-centered ITL, i.e., the difference between 
the country’s ITL and the world mean of ITL.  Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  All variables are described in detail in Table 2. 
 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1)  
Sales Growth 
0.69a   












































Cash Flow Ownership*Common Law 
-0.27   















Cash Flow Ownership*C_ITL* 
Common Law 
0.28   





Cash Flow Ownership*Enforced*C_ITL 





Cash Flow Ownership* 
C_ITL*Enforced*Common Law 




















Number of Observations 537 537 537 537 
Χ2 41.03 42.19 42.42 43.74 
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Table 8: Random Effects Regressions (Robustness) 
 
The table presents random effects regressions for the dependent variable, Log(1+Tobin’s Q), where Tobin’s 
Q is adjusted by industry, as described in Table 2.  C_ITL is mean-centered ITL, i.e., the difference between 
the country’s ITL and the world mean of ITL.  Industry Adjusted Sales Growth is the difference between the 
firm’s sales growth and the world median sales growth among firms in the same industry.  Country-
Adjusted Cash Flow Ownership is the difference between the controlling shareholder’s cash flow 
ownership and mean cash flow ownership for all firms in the country.  Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  All variables are described in detail in Table 2.  
 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) 
Industry-Adjusted Sales Growth 
0.84a   












































Country-Adjusted Cash Flow   
Ownership*Common Law 
-0.37   
















Country-Adjusted Cash Flow 
Ownership*C_ITL*Common Law 
0.19   





Country-Adjusted Cash Flow 
Ownership*Enforced*C_ITL 





Country-Adjusted Cash Flow 
Ownership*C_ITL*Enforced*Common Law 












Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(14)  
Constant 








Number of Observations 520 520 520 520 
Χ2 53.28 53.71 53.12 53.43 
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